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Abstract 
We discuss bundle auctions within the framework of an integer allocation problem. We 
show that for multi-unit auctions, of which bundle auctions are a special case, market 
equilibrium and constrained market equilibrium are equivalent concepts. This 
equivalence, allows us to obtain a computable necessary and sufficient condition for the 
existence of constrained market equilibrium for bundle auctions. We use this result to 
obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of market equilibrium for 
multi-unit auctions. After obtaining the induced bundle auction of a nonnegative TU 
game, we show that the existence of market equilibrium implies the existence of a 
possibly different market equilibrium as well, which corresponds very naturally to an 
outcome in the matching core of the TU game. Consequently we show that the matching 
core of the nonnegative TU game is non-empty if and only if the induced market game 
has a market equilibrium. 
 
Key words and Phrases: Multi-unit auctions, bundle auctions, market equilibrium, 
constrained equilibrium, nonnegative TU game, matching, matching core. 
 
JEL Classifications: 
 
Introduction: The formation of productive partnerships and sharing the yield that 
accrues from it, has been an important concern of both economics and game theory. The 
theory of matching which originated in the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley (1962), is 
largely concerned with the formation of stable two agent partnerships. The theory of 
two-sided matching as discussed in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) that grew out of the 
work of Gale and Shapley, emphasizes the formation of partnerships between pairs of 
agents, where each pair consists of agents on two distinct sides of a market. Similarly, 
the three-sided matching model of Alkan (1988)is concerned with the formation of 
possible triplets, each triplet comprising agents from three different sets. A related model 
due to Shapley and Scarf (1974) called the housing market, considers a private ownership 
economy, where each individual owns exactly one object and what is sought is the 
existence of an allocation in the core of the economy. 
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The model discussed here is based on the one proposed by Kaneko and Wooders (1982). 
They considered a feasible set of coalitions on which a worth function was defined and 
investigated the problem of there being a non-empty core for such problems. Kaneko and 
Wooders (1982), called their model a TU partitioning game. Since all coalitions are 
feasible in our model, we call ours a nonnegative TU game. In a final section of our 
paper, we discuss how our model can be used to deal with situations represented by TU 
partitioning games. 
Motivated by the work of Eriksson and Karlander (2001) and the literature on coalition 
formation, we investigate conditions under which there exists an outcome for non-
negative TU games satisfying the following conditions: 
(a)the realized coalitions form a partition of the set of agents; 
(b)the worth of each coalition in the partition is distributed exactly among the agents in 
the coalition; 
(c) no feasible coalition is worth more than the sum of what its members receive.  
We call the set of such outcomes, the matching core of the nonnegative TU game. The 
partition component of an outcome in the matching core is called a matching. 
The matching core of a nonnegative TU game is different from the core of a TU game. 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the core of a TU game, were 
first obtained by Bondareva (1963) and Scarf (1967). Our analysis and results reported 
here, are of a very different nature altogether. 
The result we seek is a pursuit similar to that of Proposition 2.4 of Eriksson and 
Karlander (2001). However, our result is different. In effect, we provide a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the existence of a non-empty matching core, for such problems, 
when pay-offs are transferable among the agents. In our definition of the matching core, 
we do not require that the sum of pay-offs to all players be equal to the worth of the 
grand coalition, even if the latter was a feasible coalition. We require instead, that the 
sum of pay-offs to players in each coalition that is realized, is equal to the worth of that 
coalition. The possibility of the grand coalition not being realized is a distinct possibility, 
and hence “budget balancedness” being superimposed on our solution concept, appears 
irrelevant. Thus, our matching core is weaker than the core in Eriksson and Karlander 
(2001).  
Moulin (1995), contains a discussion of restrictions in the pattern of coalition formation 
for games where utilities are transferable. Games of this sort that in addition admit non-
empty cores, are called universally stable. 
Our approach in this paper is based on results that may be derived for bundle auctions. A 
bundle auction is one where a non-empty finite set of items is distributed among a non-
empty finite set of buyers. 
Suppose each agent is a seller of an indivisible item that it owns and each possible 
coalition is represented by a buyer of such items. A coalition realizes it worth as pay-off 
if and only if it is able to secure the items that initially belong to its members. Otherwise, 
the coalition gets zero pay-off. Such a bundle auction is said to be induced by the 
nonnegative TU game. We show that the matching core of the nonnegative TU game is 
non-empty if and only if the induced market game has a market equilibrium. 
In the next section of this paper we discuss multi-unit auctions and bundle auctions 
within the framework of an integer allocation problem discussed in Lahiri (2006). We 
show that for multi-unit auctions of which bundle auctions are a special type, market 
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equilibrium and constrained market equilibrium are equivalent concepts. A constrained 
market equilibrium, is a market clearing profit maximizing price allocation pair, which 
arises when buyers are prevented to demand more than the initial endowment of any 
commodity at any price. Constrained market equilibrium is easier to conceive in the 
context of a bundle auction. This equivalence, allow us to obtain a computable necessary 
and sufficient condition for the existence of constrained market equilibrium for bundle 
auctions. A proof of this result is provided in an appendix to this paper. A significant 
earlier contribution to this line of research is due to Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997), 
who showed that market equilibrium for bundle auctions exist if and only if the social 
value of the optimal allocation is equal to the value of the corresponding relaxed linear 
program. Other notable existence results of market equilibrium for bundle auctions are 
due to Keslo and Crawford (1982) and Gul and Stacchetti (1997). Our existence result is 
different from the ones mentioned above. 
For multi-unit auctions, a market equilibrium is no different from a market equilibrium of 
a bundle auction, where each unit of each good is treated as a different item. Hence, for 
multi-unit auctions, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of market 
equilibrium follows immediately from the corresponding existence theorem for bundle 
auctions. Bikhchandani and Ostroy (1998), obtain existence results for what they call the 
package assignment model that are analogous to the existence result obtained by 
Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) for bundle auctions. The package assignment model is 
precisely what we refer to here as a multi-unit auction.   
After obtaining the induced bundle auction of the TU game, we show that the existence 
of a market equilibrium implies the existence of a possibly different market equilibrium 
as well, where each coalition either consumes the items initially owned by its members or 
nothing at all, and the price vector is such that the profit of each coalition is zero. Such a 
market equilibrium is then shown to correspond very naturally to an outcome in the 
matching core of the TU game, from which our main result follows.    
The interesting thing to note in this context, is that a nonnegative TU game may have a 
empty matching core, as Example 1 aptly illustrates. In view of the results we derive in 
this paper, the corresponding induced bundle auction has neither a constrained market 
equilibrium, nor a market equilibrium. 
The results obtained here for nonnegative TU games can be easily applied to situations 
where certain coalitions are prohibited from being realized, as with TU partitioning 
games. This can be achieved by setting the worth of a prohibited coalition to be zero. 
Thus, the implications of our analysis for partitioning games are as valid as they are for 
nonnegative TU games.  
 
Multi-unit Auctions and Bundle Auctions: The model in this section is a variation of 
the one in Lahiri (2006). 
Let Z = א∪{0}, where א denotes the set of natural numbers. Let there be H > 0 agents and 
L+1 > 1 commodities. The first L commodities are used as inputs to produce the L+1th 
commodity, which is a numeraire consumption good. Let w∈ZL denote the aggregate 
initial endowment of the inputs which is available for distribution among the agents.  
For j = 1,…,L, let wj denote the aggregate amount of commodity j that is initially 
available in the economy.  
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A function f: ZL →ℜ+(: the set of non-negative real numbers) is said to be a discrete 
function. 
Each agent i has preferences defined over ZL which is represented by a discrete 
production function fi, such that or all i = 1,…,H, fi is non-decreasing (i.e. for all 
x,y∈ZL:[x ≥ y] implies [fi(x) ≥ fi(y)]).  
The pair <{fi/i= 1,…,H}, w> is called an integer allocation problem. 
Our definition of an integer allocation problem here is more general than the one 
available in Lahiri (2006), since we neither invoke discrete concavity, nor do we invoke 
any well-behavedness assumption for the individual production functions.   
Let e denote the vector in ℜL all whose coordinates are equal to one and for j = 1,…,L, let 
ej denote the vector in ℜL whose jth coordinate is equal to one and all other coordinates 
are equal to zero. 
For x∈ZL, let C(x) = {y∈ZL/ y ≤ x} and let C*(x) = Convex hull of C(x).  
Note that if for a positive integer K, xk∈C(e) and tk∈(0,1) for k = 1,…,K, then ∑ = 1 
and  = x ∈C(e) implies xk = x for k = 1,…,K. If for j∈{1,…,L}, xk(j) denotes the 
jth coordinate of xk and x(j) denotes the jth coordinate of x, then: (a) 0 = if and 
only if xk(j) = 0 for k = 1,…,K; (b) 1 = if and only if xk(j) = 1 for k = 1,…,K. 
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Thus, xk(j) = x(j) for k = 1,…,K. 
Thus if f:C(e)→ℜ, then the function f*:C*(e)→ℜ where for y∈C*(e): f*(y) = 
Max{ / α(x) ≥ 0 for all x∈C(e), ∑
∈ )(
)()(
eCx
xfxα ∑
∈ )(
)(
eCx
xα = 1, ∑
∈ )(
)(
eCx
xxα = y} is always 
concave on C*(e). 
An input consumption vector of agent i is denoted by a vector Xi ∈ZL. 
A price vector p is an element of \{0}, where for j = 1,…,L, pj denotes the price of 
input j. 
L
+ℜ
At a price vector p, the objective of agent i is to maximize profits: 
Maximize [fi(Xi) – pTXi] 
An allocation is an array X = <Xi/ i = 1,…,H> such that Xi∈ZL for all i = 1,…,H. 
Given x∈ZL, let F(x) = { X = <Xi/ i = 1,…,H>/ X is an allocation satisfying = x}. 
An allocation X is said to be feasible if X∈F(w). 
∑
=
H
i
iX
1
A market equilibrium is a pair <p*,X*> where p* is a price vector, X* is a feasible 
allocation and for all i = 1,…,H, X*i maximizes profits for agent i. 
The function V:ZL→ℜ+ such that for all x∈ZL: V(x) = Max{ / X = <Xi/ i = 
1,…,H>∈F(x)}, is called the maximum value function.  
∑
=
H
i
ii Xf
1
)(
Since we have assumed that for all i = 1,…,H, fi is non-decreasing, it must be the case 
that V is non-decreasing as well (i.e. for all x,y∈ZL:[x ≥ y] implies [V(x) ≥ V(y)]).  
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A feasible allocation X*  = <X*i/i = 1,…,H> is said to be efficient if   
V(w). 
∑
=
H
i
ii Xf
1
)*( =
A constrained market equilibrium is a pair <p*,X*> where p* is a price vector, X* is a 
feasible allocation such that for all i = 1,…,H, X*i solves: 
Maximize [fi(Xi) – pTXi] 
Subject to Xi ≤ w. 
Clearly a market equilibrium is a constrained market equilibrium. 
An integer allocation problem <{fi/i= 1,…,H}, w> is said to be a multi-unit auction if for 
all i = 1,…,H and x∈ZL, fi(x) = Max{f(z)/ z ∈C(y)∩C(w)}= Max{f(z)/ zj ≤ min{xj,wj} 
for all j = 1,…,L}. 
For x, y∈ZL let m(x,y) be the L-vector whose jth coordinate is min{xj,yj}. 
Thus, if <{fi/i= 1,…,H}, w> is a multi-unit auction then for all i = 1,…,H and x ∈ZL, fi(x) 
= fi(m(x,w)). 
  
Theorem 1: Let <{fi/i= 1,…,H}, w> be a multi-unit auction. Then <p*, X*> is a 
market equilibrium if and only if it is a constrained market equilibrium. 
 
Proof: We only need to show that if <p*,X*> is a constrained market equilibrium for the 
multi unit auction <{fi/i= 1,…,H}, w>, then it is also a market equilibrium.  
Hence suppose <p*,X*> is a constrained market equilibrium. Let x∈ZL.  
If x ≤ w, then x = m(x,w) and clearly for all i = 1,…,H: fi(X*i) – p*TX*i ≥ fi(x) – p*Tx. 
Thus suppose, xj > min{xj, wj} for some j = 1,…,L. Hence for all i = 1,…,H: fi(X*i) – 
p*TX*i ≥ fi(m(x,w)) – p*Tm(x,w) ≥ fi(x) – p*Tx. Q.E.D. 
 
An multi-unit auction <{fi/i= 1,…,H}, w>  is said to be a bundle auction if w = e. 
For x ∈ ZL, let e(x) = , where ∑
> }0/{ jxj
je ∑
> }0/{ jxj
je = 0 if x = 0. Thus, x ≥ e(x) for all x ∈ZL. 
Further, e(x) = x if and only e ≥ x.  
 
Thus, if <{fi/i= 1,…,H}, e> is a bundle auction then for all x∈ZL: m(x,e) = e(x). 
 
If <{fi/i= 1,…,H}, e> is a bundle auction we represent it simply as [fi/i= 1,…,H]. 
 
It follows from Theorem 1, that for multi-unit auctions in general and bundle auctions in 
particular, constrained market equilibrium and market equilibrium are identical concepts. 
Hence the extension of the production functions fi, for i = 1,…,H, outside the unit cube is 
irrelevant for equilibrium analysis in the context of bundle auctions.  
 
A function f: ZL→ℜ is said to be Weakly Monotonic at w if: 
(1) For all j = 1,…,L: f(w + ej) ≥ f(w); 
(2) f(w + e) > f(w). 
 
An immediate consequence of Theorem 1 above and Theorem 4 of Lahiri (2006) is the 
following result, which is of considerable interest by itself. 
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Theorem 2: A necessary and sufficient condition for a bundle auction [fi/i= 1,…,H] with 
V:ZL→ℜ+ weakly monotonic at e, to admit a (constrained) market equilibrium is that: 
V(e) is the optimal value of the linear programming maximization problem: 
Maximize  ∑
∈ )2(
)()(
eCx
xVxα
Subject to  = e,  ∑
∈ )2(
)(
eCx
xxα
       = 1, ∑
∈ )2(
)(
eCx
xα
          α(x) ≥ 0 for all x∈C(2e), 
where C(2e) = {x∈ZL/ x ≤ 2e}. 
 
For the sake of completeness an independent proof of Theorem 2, which follows closely 
the one available in Lahiri (2006) for integer allocation problems (under the additional 
discrete concavity and well-behavedness assumptions for individual production 
functions), is provided in an appendix to this paper. 
 
Without the Weak Monotonicity of V at e, we are not able to ensure that the vector of 
prices is non-zero. We can only guarantee that the vector is non-negative, which is not 
enough for it to be a price vector. 
 
Given y∈ZM, let y-∈ZM be defined thus: y-(k) = min {y(k), 1} for all k =1,…,M. 
For i ∈ {1,…,H}, define hi : ZM→ℜ+  as follows: for y∈ZM: hi(y) = fi(x(y-)). 
 
Equivalence Theorem For Multi-unit Auctions:  
(a) [hi/ i = 1,…,H] is a bundle auction on M commodities;  
(b) <p,X> is a market equilibrium for <{fi/i= 1,…,H}, w> if and only if <q,Y> is a 
market equilibrium for [hi/ i = 1,…,H], where for all j∈{1,…,L} and k∈Ij: qk = pj and 
Y is a feasible allocation for [hi/ i = 1,…,H] satisfying x(Yi) = Xi for all i = 1,…,H.  
  
Proof: That (a) is true is easily observed. Hence let us prove (b). 
Let <p,X> be a market equilibrium for <{fi/i= 1,…,H}, w>. Let q∈ and Y be defined 
as follows: (a) for all j∈{1,…,L}: qk = pj for all k∈Ij; (b) For all j∈{1,…,L}, agent 1 gets 
the first X1 of the wj items in Ij at Y, agent 2 gets the next X2 of the remaining items in Ij 
at Y,… and so on, till agent H gets the last XH items in Ij at Y. 
M
+ℜ
Clearly <p,Y> is a market equilibrium for [hi/ i = 1,…,H].   
Now, let <q,Y> be a market equilibrium for [hi/ i = 1,…,H].  
If for some j∈{1,…,L} with wj > 1, it is the case that two different agents consume two 
distinct units of j at different prices, then the one who bought it at the higher price, could 
increase its profit by purchasing the less priced unit instead of the unit it has been 
allocated. Thus, <q,Y> could not be a market equilibrium.  
If for some j∈{1,…,L} with wj > 1, it is the case that some agent i consumes all wj units 
but at different prices, then on transferring one unit of consumption of the jth good from 
unit k* to unit k', where k*,k'∈Ij and k* ≠ k' in the bundle auction , the decrease in i’s 
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profits should be fi(x(Yi)) – fi(x(Yi)-ej) – qTYi +qTYi – qk* + qk' = fi(x(Yi)) – fi(x(Yi)-ej) – 
qk* + qk' ≥ 0. Thus, qk' – qk* ≥ fi(x(Yi)) – fi(x(Yi)-ej) for all k', k*∈Ij with k' ≠ k*. This 
once again implies that qk'  = qk* for all k',k*∈Ij. Thus, for all j∈{1,…,L}: qk = Min{qk'/ 
k'∈Ij} for all k∈Ij.  
Let p∈ , be such that pj = Min{qk/ k∈Ij} for all j = 1,…,L. Let X be the allocation such 
that for all i = 1,…,H, Xi =  
L
+ℜ ∑
∈ jIk
i kY )( .
Thus, <p,X> is a market equilibrium for <{fi/i= 1,…,H}, w>. Q.E.D. 
 
The maximum value function V#:ZM→ℜ+ for [hi/ i = 1,…,H], is given by V#(y) = V(x(y)) 
for all y∈ZM, where V is the maximum value function for the multi-unit auction <{fi/i= 
1,…,H}, w>. 
 
As a consequence of Theorem 2 and the Equivalence Theorem for Multi-unit auctions we 
get the following result. 
 
Existence of Market Equilibrium Theorem for Multi-unit Auctions: 
Let <{fi/i= 1,…,H}, w> be a multi-unit auction and suppose the maximum value V 
satisfies Weak Monotonicity at w. Then, <{fi/i= 1,…,H}, w> has a (constrained) market 
equilibrium if and only if V(w) is the optimum value of the following linear 
programming problem: 
Maximize  ∑
∈ )2(
)()(
wCx
xVxα
Subject to  = w,  ∑
∈ )2(
)(
wCx
xxα
       = 1, ∑
∈ )2(
)(
wCx
xα
          α(x) ≥ 0 for all x∈C(2w), 
where C(2w) = {x∈ZL/ x ≤ 2w}. 
 
 
The Shapley and Shubik (1972) Assignment Game: The Shapley and Shubik (1972) 
assignment game is an example of a bundle auction which satisfies the conditions of 
Theorem 2 and thus admits a market equilibrium. 
A bundle auction [fi/ i = 1,…,H] is said to be Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game, if L 
= H and for all i = 1,…,H: (i) there exists j∈{1,…,L} such that fi(j) > 0; (ii) for all 
x∈C(e), fi(x) = Max{fi(ej)/ xj = 1}, if x > 0. 
Suppose that for some efficient allocation X# it is the case that for all i = 1,…,H: fi(X#) ≥ 
fi(ej) for all j = 1,…,L. Then clearly X#i ∈{ej/ j = 1,…,L}. Let p* = (Min {fi(X#i)/ i = 
1,…,H})e. Thus, <p*, X#> is a market equilibrium. 
Hence assume that for no efficient allocation X# it is the case that for all i = 1,…,H: fi(X#) 
≥ fi(ej) for all j = 1,…,L. 
Thus, V(2e) > V(e), i.e. V satisfies Weak Monotonicity at e.   
Let α(x) ≥ 0 for all x∈C(2e) be such that ∑
∈ )2(
)(
eCx
xα = 1 and ∑
∈ )2(
)(
eCx
xxα = e.     
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For each x∈C(2e), let Xx = <Xx,i/ i = 1,…,H>∈F(x), such that = V(x). ∑
=
H
i
ixi Xf
1
, )(
Thus, for all i ∈{1,…,H}, there exists X*x,i ∈{ej/ j = 1,…,L}∪{0}, such that X*x,i ≤ Xx,i 
and fi(X*x,i) = fi(Xx,i). 
Thus, ≤ e and V(x) = for all x∈C(2e). ∑ ∑
∈ =)2( 1
, )*)((
eCx
H
i
ixXxα ∑
=
H
i
ixi Xf
1
, )*(
Thus, = ( ) .  ∑
∈ )2(
)()(
eCx
xVxα ∑
∈ )2(
)(
eCx
xα ∑
=
H
i
ixi Xf
1
, )*(
It is well known that V(e) is the optimum value of the following linear programming 
maximization problem: 
Maximize  ∑∑
==
L
j
jii
H
i
efjx
11
)()(
Subject to ≤ 1 for all i = 1,…,H, ∑
=
L
j
i jx
1
)(
                 ≤ 1 for all j = 1,…,L ∑
=
H
i
i jx
1
)(
xi(j) ≥ 0 for all i = 1,…,H and j = 1,…,L. 
Since the array< / i = 1,…,H and j = 1,…,L> is feasible for the above 
problem, = ( ) ≤ V(e). 
∑
∈ )2(
)(*)(
eCx
i jXxα
∑
∈ )2(
)()(
eCx
xVxα ∑
∈ )2(
)(
eCx
xα ∑
=
H
i
ixi Xf
1
, )*(
By Theorem 2, there exists a market equilibrium for the Shapley and Shubik Assignment 
Game. 
 
Games with Transferable Utilities: Given a positive integer n ≥ 3, and a set of agents N 
= {1,…,n}, let ∏ be the set of all non-empty subsets of N. 
A non-negative TU game (or game with transferable utilities) is a function v:∏ →ℜ+, 
such that: (i) For all i∈N: v({i}) = 0; (ii) v(S) > 0 for at least one S∈Π. 
S∈Π is said to be a coalition, and v(S) is said to be the “worth” of the coalition S. 
The reason why we use the prefix “nonnegative” in the above definition is because in 
general a TU game need not be non-negative. Further, a TU game normally specifies the 
worth of the empty set to be zero. We define our game on non-empty sets. By itself, 
requiring the worth of a singleton to be equal to zero, is a harmless normalization. 
Requiring the worth of at least one coalition to be positive makes the game non-trivial, as 
will be observed shortly. 
A matching is a partition A of N, i.e. A is a non-empty collection of mutually disjoint sets 
in Π whose union is N. 
A pay-off vector is an element of . N+ℜ
An outcome of is a pair (A,x), where x is a pay-off vector and A is a matching. 
An outcome (A,x) is said to belong to the matching core of the nonnegative TU game v 
if: 
 8
(1) for all S∈A: = v(S); ∑
∈Si
ix )(
(3) for all S∈∏: ≥ v(S). ∑
∈Si
ix )(
Let C(v) denote the set of outcomes that belong to the matching core of v.  
Since v(S) > 0 for at least one coalition S, (A,x)∈C(v) implies x ≠ 0. 
If we had allowed the worth of every coalition to be zero, then for such a game v,C(v) = 
{(A,0)/ A is a partition of N}. Assuming that the worth of at least coalition is positive, 
rules out such trivial possibilities. 
The following example due to Ahmet Alkan shows that the matching core of a 
nonnegative TU game v may be empty. 
Example 1 (due to Ahmet Alkan): Let N = {1,2,3,4,5}. Let v(S) = 30 if S has exactly 
three agents and zero otherwise. Towards a contradiction suppose (A,x) belongs to C(v). 
If S is a three agent set belonging to A, then at x, at least one member of S, say j, gets at 
most 10. Since the agents in N\S get zero, the total amount obtained by j and agents in 
N\S is less than 30, although they form a three-member set.  
Thus, every agent in N gets zero at x. Clearly, (A,x) does not belong to C(v). 
 
Games with Transferable Utilities as Bundle Auctions: Let L = n and H = 2n – 1. Let 
Π = {S1,…,SH}. For i∈{1,…<H}, let vi: ZL →ℜ+ be defined as follows:  
vi(x) = vi(e(x)) = v(Si) if Si ⊂ {j/ xj > 0}, 
                        =  0, otherwise. 
[vi/ i = 1,…,H] is said to be the bundle auction induced by v. 
 
If Si is a singleton, then vi(x) = 0 for all x∈ZL. 
For S∈Π, let eS be defined to be equal to ∑
∈Sj
je . 
Proposition 1: Let <p*,X*> be a market equilibrium for [vi/ i = 1,…,H]. Then, there 
exists a market equilibrium <p*,X&> such that for all k = 1,…,H: X&k ∈{0, }. kSe
 
Proof: Let S = Si ∈Π and suppose X*i = eQ ∉{0, eS}. 
Case 1: S is a proper subset of Q. 
Since vi(eQ) – p*TeQ ≥ vi(eS) – p*TeS = vi(eQ) – p*TeS. 
Thus, 0 ≥ p*T(eQ – eS) = p*TeQ\S = ∑
∈ SQj
jp
\
* . 
Since p* ≥ 0, = 0 for all j∈Q\S. *jp
Let X#i = eS, X#k = X*k + ej if Sk = {j} and j∈Q\S, X#k = X*k otherwise. 
It is easy to verify that <p*,X#> is a market equilibrium: 
vi(X#i) – p*TX#i = v(S) - = v(S) -∑
∈Sj
jp
* ∑
∈Qj
jp
* = vi(X*i) – p*TX*i;  
vk(X#k) –p*TX#k = vk(X*k + ej) – p*TX*k - = vk(X*k + ej) – p*TX*k if Sk = {j} and 
j∈Q\S. 
*
jp
The feasibility of X# follows from the feasibility of X* and the fact that X# is obtained 
from X* by transferring items from S to one or more coalitions outside S. 
 9
For j∈Q\S and Sk = {j}, X*k + ej does not belong to {0, ej} if and only if X*k is not equal 
to zero. Since X*k cannot be equal to ej, it follows that |{i/X*k∉{0, }| > |{i/X#k∉{0, 
}|. 
kSe
kSe
Case 2: S\Q is non-empty and Q\S is non-empty. 
Thus, vi(eQ) = 0. 
Since –p*TeQ = vi(eQ) – p*TeQ ≥ vi(0) – p*T0 = 0 and since p* ≥ 0, we get = 0 for all 
j∈Q. 
*
jp
Let X#i = 0, X#k = X*k + ej if Sk = {j} and j∈Q, X#k = X*k otherwise. 
It is easy to verify that <p*,X#> is a market equilibrium: 
vi(X#i) – p*TX#i = 0 = vi(X*i) – p*TX*i;  
vk(X#k) –p*TX#k = vk(X*k + ej) – p*TX*k - = vk(X*k + ej) – p*TX*k if Sk = {j} and j∈Q. *jp
The feasibility of X# follows from the feasibility of X* and the fact that X# is obtained 
from X* by transferring items belonging to coalition S to the members of Q. 
For j∈Q and Sk = {j}, X*k + ej does not belong to {0, ej} if and only if X*k is not equal to 
zero. Since X*k cannot be equal to ej, it follows that |{i/X*k∉{0, }| > |{i/X#k∉{0, 
}|. 
kSe
kSe
Case 3: Q is a non-empty proper subset of S. 
Thus, vi(eQ) = 0. 
Since –p*TeQ = vi(eQ) – p*TeQ ≥ vi(0) – p*T0 = 0 and since p* ≥ 0, we get = 0 for all 
j∈Q. 
*
jp
Let X#i = 0, X#k = X*k + ej if Sk = {j} and j∈Q, X#k = X*k otherwise. 
It is easy to verify that <p*,X#> is a market equilibrium: 
vi(X#i) – p*TX#i = 0 = vi(X*i) – p*TX*i;  
vk(X#k) –p*TX#k = vk(X*k + ej) – p*TX*k - = vk(X*k + ej) – p*TX*k if Sk = {j} and j∈Q. *jp
The feasibility of X# follows from the feasibility of X* and the fact that X# is obtained 
from X* by transferring items belonging to S to the members of Q. 
For j∈Q and Sk = {j}, X*k + ej does not belong to {0, ej} if and only if X*k is not equal to 
zero. Since X*k cannot be equal to ej, it follows that |{i/X*k∉{0, }| > |{i/X#k∉{0, 
}|. 
kSe
kSe
Thus, in each case we obtain a market equilibrium <p*, X#> such that |{i/X*k∉{0, }| 
> |{i/X#k∉{0, }|. 
kSe
kSe
Repeating the process at most finitely many times, we arrive at a market equilibrium 
<p*,X&> such that for all k = 1,…,H: X&k ∈{0, }. Q.E.D. kSe
 
Proposition 2: Let <p*,X*> be a market equilibrium for [vi/ i = 1,…,H] such that for all i 
= 1,…,H: X*i∈{0, }. Then there exists a market equilbrium <q*,X*> such that vi(X*i) 
– q*TX*i = 0 for all i = 1,…,H. 
iSe
 
Proof: Since <p*,X*> is a equilibrium for the induced bundle auction [vi/i = 1,…,H] and 
X*i∈{0, } for all i = 1,…,H, it must be the case that {Si/ X*i ≠ 0} is a partition of N. 
Further, vi(X*i) – p*TX*i ≥ 0 for all i = 1,…,H.  
iSe
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For i∈{1,…,H} and X*i = , let =  + (iSe *jq *jp ||
**)(
i
iT
i
S
XpSv − ) for all j∈Si. 
Thus for i∈{1,…,H} and X*i = : iSe
q*TX*i = q*T = = + v(Si) – p*TX*i = iSe ∑
∈ iSj
jq
* ∑
∈ iSj
jp
* ∑
∈ iSj
jp
* + v(Si) - ∑
∈ iSj
jp
* = v(Si) = 
vi(X*i). 
If X*i = 0, then vi(X*i) – q*TX*i = 0. Q.E.D. 
 
In view of Proposition 2, we say that a market equilibrium <p*,X*> is a zero-profit 
market equilibrium if vi(X*i) – q*TX*i = 0 for all i = 1,…,H.  
 
Market Equilibrium and Matching Cores: In this section we establish the main 
consequences of our present investigation. 
 
Theorem 3: (A,x) belongs to C(v) if and only if <x,X*> is a zero-profit market 
equilibrium, where for i = 1,…,H: [X*i = if and only if Si∈A; X*i = 0 if and only if 
Si∈Π\A]. 
iSe
 
Proof: Let (A,x) belong to the matching core of v and <x,X*> be as defined in the 
statement of this theorem. Thus, x ≥ 0 and x ≠ 0. This implies that x is a price vector. 
Suppose Si∈A. 
Thus, X*i = and vi(X*i) – xTX*i = v(Si) - iSe ∑
∈ iSj
jx )( = 0. Further, vi(eS) – xTeS = v(Si) - 
 ≤ v(Si) - = 0 if Si ⊂ S. ∑
∈Sj
jx )( ∑
∈ iSj
jx )(
If Si ⊄ S, then vi(eS) – xTeS = 0 - ∑
∈Sj
jx )(  ≤ 0 and vi(0) – xT0 = 0. 
Since  = e, <x,X*> is a zero profit market equilibrium. ∑
=
H
i
iX
1
* = ∑
∈AS
S
i
ie
Now suppose <x,X*> is a zero profit market equilibrium and let A = {Si∈Π/ X*i = }. iSe
If v(Si) - = vi( ) - = 0 if Si∈A. ∑
∈ iSj
jx )( iSe ∑
∈ iSj
jx )(
If Si∉A, then v(Si) - = vi( ) - ∑
∈ iSj
jx )( iSe ∑
∈ iSj
jx )( ≤ vi(0) – xT0 = 0. 
Thus, (A,x)∈C(v). Q.E.D. 
 
The following result follows directly from Propositions 1, 2 and Theorem 3, and is the 
main consequence of the analysis reported above. 
 
Theorem 4: Let v be a non-negative TU game and [vi/ i = 1,…,H] be the bundle auction 
induced by v. Then C(v) is non-empty if and only if there exists a market equilibrium for 
[vi/ i = 1,…,H]. 
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Let us use Example 1 and Theorem 2 to illustrate Theorem 4. In Example 1, C(v) is 
empty. Let [vi/ i = 1,…,H] be the induced bundle auction where H = 25 – 1 and L = 5. 
In Π, let S1 = {1,2,3}, S2 = {3,4,5}, S3 = {1,2,4} and S5 = {5}. Let X be the allocation 
where for i = 1,2,3,4, Xi = ; for i > 4, let Xi = 0. Clearly X∈F(2e). Thus, V(2e) ≥ 
= = 90. Further, V(e) = 30, and V is Weakly Monotonic at e. 
iSe
∑
=
4
1
)(
i
Si iev ∑
=
4
1
)(
i
iSv
Since e = 
2
1 2e +
2
1 0 and V(e) = 30 < 
2
1 (90) + 
2
1 (0) ≤ 
2
1 V(2e) + 
2
1 V(0), by Theorem 2 
the induced bundle auction has no market equilibrium, as was to be expected from 
Theorem 4. 
The non-existence of market equilibrium for this induced bundle auction can also be 
established without using Theorem 2. We then need to use Propositions 1 and 2 instead. 
Towards a contradiction suppose <p*, X*> is a zero profit market equilibrium such that 
for all i = 1,…,H: X*i∈{0, }. Since a market equilibrium satisfies efficiency, there 
exists a coalition S containing at least three agents such that S gets eS. Suppose S = Si. 
Thus, vi( ) - = 0. Since, vi( ) = 30, there exists k∈Si such that > 0. 
iSe
iSe *
jSj i
p∑
∈
iSe *kp
If |S| > 3, then vi( ) - = vi( ) - }{\ kSie *
}{\ jkSj i
p∑
∈
iSe *
jSj i
p∑
∈
+ = > 0 = vi( ) - , 
contradicting that <p*,X*> is a market equilibrium. 
*
kp
*
kp i
Se *
jSj i
p∑
∈
Hence suppose |S| = 3. It is easily observed that for j∈N\S: = 0. *jp
Thus, vi( ) -  = vi( ) - )\(}){\( SNkSie ∪ *
)\(}){\( jSNkSj i
p∑
∪∈
iSe *
jSj i
p∑
∈
+ = = > 0 = vi( ) - , 
contradicting that <p*,X*> is a market equilibrium. 
*
kp
*
kp i
Se *
jSj i
p∑
∈
The non-existence of a market equilibrium now follows from Propositions 1 and 2.  
 
Discussion: It may often be the case that the problem being considered prohibits the 
formation of certain coalitions. Thus for instance in a two-sided matching model, two or 
more agents on the same side of the market cannot form a coalition. Our statement of a 
nonnegative TU game is general enough to accommodate such possibilities.  
If S is a coalition which is prohibited then we set its worth v(S) to be equal to zero. Let 
(A,x) belong to C(v). If S does not belong to A, then there is clearly no problem to be 
addressed. What if S belongs to A? 
If S belongs to A, then x(k) must be equal to zero for all k in S. If instead of (A,x) we 
considered the outcome (A*,x) where A* = (A\{S})∪{{k}/ k∈S}, then it is easily 
verified that this new outcome belongs to C(v) as well. The difference between A and A* 
is that all prohibited coalitions in A are replaced by their members. Thus, our model is 
general enough to cope with the exigencies that arise in matching problems, particularly 
in the context of markets. 
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like to thank him for his comments on an earlier version of this paper, and in particular 
for Example 1. 
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Appendix 
 
Let [fi/ i = 1,…,H] be a bundle auction and let V:ZL→ℜ+ denote the corresponding 
maximum value function. 
 
Theorem A.1: Let X* be a feasible allocation and p* a price vector. <p*,X*> is a market 
equilibrium if and only if the pair <p*,m*> solves: 
Minimize + pTw  ∑
=
H
i
im
1
)(
Subject to + pTx ≥ V(x) for all x∈ZL with x ≤ 2e, p∈  ∑
=
H
i
im
1
)( L+ℜ
where m*∈ℜH with m* = <m*(i)/ i = 1,..H> satisfies m*(i) = fi(X*i) – p*TX*i for i = 
1,…,H.  
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Proof: Suppose <p*,X*> is a market equilibrium. Let x∈ZL and V(x) =∑ where 
X = <Xi/ i = 1,…,H>∈F(x). 
=
H
i
ii Xf
1
)(
Thus, for all i = 1,…,H: fi(X*i) – p*TX*i ≥ fi(Xi) – p*TXi. 
Summing over i we get: + p*Tx ≥ V(x) for all x∈ZL . ∑
=
H
i
im
1
)(*
Thus, <p*,m*> satisfies the constraints. 
Now, let <p,m> satisfy the constraints. Thus, ∑ + pTe ≥ V(e). 
=
H
i
im
1
)(
However, since X* is efficient we get ∑ + p*Te = V(e). 
=
H
i
im
1
)(*
Thus, + pTe ≥ + p*Te. ∑
=
H
i
im
1
)( ∑
=
H
i
im
1
)(*
Hence, <p*,m*> solves the minimization problem. 
Now, suppose <p*,m*> solves the given minimization problem. Towards a contradiction 
suppose <p*, X*> is not a market equilibrium. By Theorem 1, <p*, X*> is not a 
constrained market equilibrium either. Thus, there exists i ∈H and x∈ZL, with x ≤ e, such 
that fi(x) – p*Tx > fi(X*i) –p*TX*i. 
Thus, x ≤ X*i + e. 
Since X*∈F(e), w* = x + ∑ ≤ X*i + e + 
≠ik
kX * ∑
≠ik
kX * = e + e = 2e. 
Thus, V(w*) ≥ fi(x) + ∑
≠ik
kk Xf )*(  
                     > fi(X*i) –p*TX*i + p*Tx + ∑
≠ik
kk Xf )*( - p*T∑
≠ik
kX * +p*T∑
≠ik
kX *  
                     = fi(X*i) –p*TX*i + ∑
≠ik
kk Xf )*( - p*T∑
≠ik
kX * +p*Tw*  
                     = + p*Tw*,  ∑
=
H
i
im
1
)(*
leading to a contradiction. 
This establishes the theorem. Q.E.D. 
 
Theorem A.2: There exists a market equilibrium if and only if there exists a price vector 
p* such that V(e) – p*Te ≥ V(x) – p*Tx for all x∈ZL with x ≤ 2e. 
 
Proof: Let <p*, X*> be a market equilibrium. Thus X* must be efficient, and hence 
= V(e). ∑
=
H
i
ii Xf
1
)*(
Let x∈ZL with x ≤ 2e. By Theorem A.1, V(e) – p*e ≥ V(x) – p*T x, since ∑ = e.  
=
H
i
iX
1
*
Now suppose there exists a price vector p* such that V(e) – p*Te ≥ V(x) – p*Tx  for all 
x∈ZL with x ≤ 2e. Let X* be an efficient allocation. Since the feasible set is finite such an 
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allocation always exists. Thus, = V(e). Let, m*∈ℜH with m* = <m*(i)/ i = 
1,..H> satisfying m*(i) = fi(X*i) – p*TX*i for i = 1,…,H. Since, + p*Tx = V(e) – 
p*Te + p*Tx ≥ V(x) for all x∈ZL with x ≤ 2e, <p*,m*> satisfies the constraints of the 
linear programming problem in Theorem A.1. 
∑
=
H
i
ii Xf
1
)*(
∑
=
H
i
im
1
)(*
Let m∈ℜH with m = <m(i)/ i = 1,..H> satisfy ∑ + pTx ≥ V(x) for all x∈ZL with x ≤ 
2e. 
=
H
i
im
1
)(
Thus, + pTe ≥ V(e) = + p*Te. ∑
=
H
i
im
1
)( ∑
=
H
i
im
1
)(*
Thus, <p*, m*> solves the linear programming problem in Theorem A.1. By Theorem 
A.1, <p*, X*> is a market equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
 
Observe that the cardinality of C(2e) = 3L. 
 
Lemma A.1: V(e) is the optimal value of the linear programming maximization problem: 
Maximize  ∑
∈ )2(
)()(
eCx
xVxα
Subject to  = e,  ∑
∈ )2(
)(
eCx
xxα
       = 1, ∑
∈ )2(
)(
eCx
xα
          α(x) ≥ 0 for all x∈C(2e). 
if and only if there exists p∈ℜL such that V(e) – pTe ≥ V(x) – pT x for all x∈C(2e). 
 
Proof: Let C(2e)\{e} be equal to the set {xk/ k = 1,…,3L-1}. 
Suppose V(e) solves the given linear programming problem. Towards a contradiction 
suppose there does not exist p∈ℜL such that V(e) – pTe ≥ V(x) – pT x for all x∈C(2e). 
Hence, there does not exist α, β∈  and γ∈ : αT(xk – e) - βT (xk – e) - γk = V(xk) – 
V(e) for all k = 1,…,3L-1. 
L
+ℜ 13 −+ℜ L
By Farkas' Theorem there exists t∈ such that ≤ 0, - ≤ 0 
and > 0.  
13 −
+ℜ L ∑−
=
−
13
1
)(
L
k
kk ext ∑−
=
−
13
1
)(
L
k
kk ext
∑−
=
−
13
1
)]()([
L
k
kk eVxVt
 Thus, > 0. ∑−
=
13
1
L
k
kt
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Dividing the three inequalities above by , we get there exists s∈ such that 
= e, =1  and > V(e), contradicting that V(e) solves the given 
optimization problem. 
∑−
=
13
1
L
k
kt 13 −+ℜ L
∑−
=
13
1
L
k
kk xs ∑−
=
13
1
L
k
ks ∑−
=
13
1
)(
L
k
kk xVs
Hence, there exists p∈ℜL such that V(e) – pTe ≥ V(x) – pT x for all x∈C(2e). 
Now suppose that there exists p∈ℜL such that V(e) – pTe ≥ V(x) – pT x for all x∈C(2e). 
Hence there exists α, β∈  and γ∈ : α, β∈  and γ∈ : αT(xk – e) - βT (xk – e) 
- γk = V(xk) – V(e) for all k = 1,…,3L-1. 
L
+ℜ M+ℜ L+ℜ 13 −+ℜ L
By Farkas' Theorem there does not exist t∈ such that = 0, and 
> 0.  
13 −
+ℜ L ∑−
=
−
13
1
)(
L
k
kk ext
∑−
=
−
13
1
)]()([
L
k
kk eVxVt
Thus, [t∈ , tk ≥ 0 for k = 1,…,3L-1, e = , = 1] implies [ V(e) 
≥ ]. 
13 −
+ℜ L k
k
k xt
L
∑−
=
13
1
∑−
=
13
1
L
k
kt
)(
13
1
k
k
k xVt
L
∑−
=
Thus, V(e) solves the given optimization problem. Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma A.2: Suppose V: ZL→ℜ is Weakly Monotonic at e. Then, V(e) is the optimal 
value of the linear programming maximization problem: 
Maximize  ∑
∈ )2(
)()(
eCx
xVxα
Subject to  = e,  ∑
∈ )2(
)(
eCx
xxα
       = 1, ∑
∈ )2(
)(
eCx
xα
          α(x) ≥ 0 for all x∈C(2e). 
if and only if there exists p∈ \{0} such that V(e) – pTe ≥ V(x) – pT x for all x∈C(2e). L+ℜ
  
Proof: By Lemma A.1, V(e) is the optimal value of the linear programming maximization 
problem in the statement of Lemma A.2, if and only if there exists if and only if there 
exists p∈ℜL such that V(e) – pTe ≥ V(x) – pT x for all x∈C(2e).   
Suppose towards a contradiction V(e) is the optimal value of the above linear 
programming maximization problem, but pj < 0, for some j.  
Then, 0 ≤ V(e + ej) – V(e) by Weak Monotonicity of V at e and V(e + ej) – V(e) ≤ pT(e + 
ej – e) = pj < 0, leads to a contradiction. 
Thus p∈ . L+ℜ
If p = 0, then 0 < V(2e) – V(w) by Weak Monotonicity and V(2e) – V(e) ≤ pTe = 0, again 
leads to a contradiction. 
Thus, p∈ \{0}. Q.E.D. L+ℜ
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In view of Lemmas A.1 and A.2 and Theorem A.2, we obtain Theorem 2. 
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